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Abstract
This article examines conspiracy theory as an integral part of political practice. In 2010,
following a tumultuous year that included a military takeover and a junta-led massacre of
civilians, the Republic of Guinea held what was widely considered to be the country’s first
democratic presidential election since independence in 1958. During this time, many
Guineans regularly exchanged information about secret intrigues at the highest levels of
politics. These popular reports of powerful figures conspiring to fix the election influenced
people’s talk and actions, contributing to an environment in which abstract suspicions
crystallized in real, and sometimes violent, events. These events in turn heightened suspicions
of high-level conspiracy and, among people who identified as ethnic Fulɓe, reinforced the
widespread conviction that they were being targeted. Focusing ethnographically on two
episodes in which theories of conspiracy influenced how Guineans perceived and shaped the
course of the 2010 elections, this article explores conspiracy theorizing as an emergent mode
of politics that may have profound effects.
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In 2010, the Republic of Guinea held democratic presidential elections for the first time since
independence from France in 1958.1 Twenty-four candidates competed in the first round in
June. Two candidates advanced to a run-off election that was originally supposed to be held
in July, but was postponed repeatedly until November. During these months of waiting and
uncertainty, rumours about corruption and fraud in the electoral process circulated
extensively among Guineans who identified as ethnic Fulɓe. Many Fulɓe became convinced
that people at the highest echelons of power – including political leaders, members of the
Independent National Electoral Commission, the ruling military-led regime, the United
Nations, and the governments of France and the USA – were conspiring to fix the election
results. These theories of conspiracy provided opportunities for much discussion and
speculation as the election season wore on, contributing to an environment in which abstract,
flexible suspicions occasionally crystallized into decisive, and sometimes violent, actions and
events.
As an anthropologist then living in Guinea’s Fouta Djallon highlands, a region where ethnic
Fulɓe predominate, I heard people discuss the elections nearly every day. As the weeks and
months passed, popular interpretations of political events became increasingly fraught with
suspicion not only of powerful individuals and entities, but also of broad segments of the
Guinean population. The run-off election was finally held on 7 November. By that time, the
Fulɓe, generally represented as Guinea’s largest ethnic group, making up around 40 per cent
1

From independence until 1984, elections were held only for offices within Guinea’s single

socialist political party; a multiparty system was established in 1992, but subsequent elections
were controlled by the ruling party and not viewed as truly competitive (Carter Center 2011:
8).
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of the population, had begun to speak of themselves as a newly solidified bloc united in
mutual enmity and distrust against the rest of the country – especially the Maninka, typically
estimated at 30 per cent of Guineans.2 Fulɓe voters levelled accusations of systemic fraud
against the winning candidate and his party, despite international observers’ favourable
reports of the election’s credibility. Episodes of violence occurred across the country. Guinea,
long a relatively stable country in a notoriously unstable region, a country where national
unity had been a powerful rallying cry since independence, now appeared divided.
The association between electoral politics and ethnicity was not an entirely new phenomenon
in Guinea.3 But the process through which people came to identify with and against particular
ethnic groups and political parties could have played out differently. It was not inevitable that
‘Fulɓe’ and ‘Maninka’ would become salient markers of identity in some marginal
communities, nor that people who identified with neither of these large groups would vote
overwhelmingly for the Maninka candidate and against the Fulɓe one, yet this was what
happened. How did this particular set of allegiances and animosities emerge? How did
support for one candidate – a man who had spent much of his life in exile abroad after having
been accused of treason – coalesce across the country and inspire targeted violence in some
areas? And how did support for the other candidate – a figure formerly disliked by many
members of his own ethnic constituency – become so palpable that, when he lost, his
supporters were willing to act violently on his behalf, to view neighbours as enemies, and to
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Mike McGovern deconstructs the population statistics on Guinea given by the CIA World

Factbook and frequently cited by journalists, diplomats and aid agencies, showing that these
‘suspiciously round’ numbers – 40 per cent Fulɓe, 30 per cent Maninka, 20 per cent Susu and
10 per cent Forestier – are not based on census or any demographic data, leave out a number
of smaller ethnic groups, and are, at best, a guess that has gained the status of hegemonic
truth. Analysing past census data, McGovern suggests that an ‘educated guess … that each
ethnolinguistic bloc accounts for somewhere between about 15 and 25 per cent of the national
population’ would have ‘as much or more basis in available facts’, although these numbers
‘would shock, and even anger, many Guineans’ (McGovern 2017: 44, 51–5).
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then-president Lansana Conté’s administration, when a multiparty system existed in theory
but Conté’s party controlled elections in reality.
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threaten to devastate the country’s economy by leaving and taking their businesses with
them?
This article explores the emergence of political actions, events and orientations through the
practice of conspiracy theorizing. Paul Silverstein has defined conspiracy theorizing in the
context of the Algerian civil war as a ‘diverse set of communicative practices … that
prioritize agency and fetishize causality in making sense of everyday incoherence’
(Silverstein 2002: 644). Conspiracy theorizing is similar to the ‘paranoid style’ that historian
Richard Hofstadter famously identified in American politics, where what some might see as
error and incompetence instead appears as treason, and where historical events are personal,
‘the consequences of someone’s will’ (Hofstadter 1964: 81, 83). In conspiracy theorizing,
agency and intention, rather than accident and coincidence, underlie every unfortunate event,
and as a result the world becomes both particularly meaningful and particularly insecure.
The term ‘conspiracy theory’ tends to situate suspicions in the realm of the unfounded and
unreasonable (Pelkmans and Machold 2011). Political and economic inequalities often shape
whether a narrative appears as legitimate public discourse or conspiracy theory, thereby
erasing histories of violence, neglect and injustice (Briggs 2004). In Guinea, I occasionally
heard American and European expatriates lament the way in which Guineans so often
circulated conspiracy theories about the political transition. In this framing, the Guinean
population appeared gullible and paranoid, ignorant of political realities and likely to act (and
vote) irrationally against their own best interests. This representation not only dismissed the
validity of Guineans’ concerns about the integrity of a new and untried electoral process, it
also elided a regional history that includes the Atlantic slave trade, colonialism, violent civil
wars and the pillaging of natural and mineral resources. By taking these histories into
account, it becomes clear that particular conspiracy theories that may not be strictly verifiable
may nevertheless index larger truths (cf. White 2000; Jackson 2005).
George Marcus has described conspiracy theorizing in the wake of the Cold War – an era
defined by a ‘massive project of paranoid social thought and action’ when superpowers
regularly intervened in the internal politics of client states – as ‘paranoia within reason’
(Marcus 1999: 2). Guinea’s own Cold War-era socialist period (1958–84), led by
independence activist and first president Sékou Touré, was characterized by periodic
revelations of plots allegedly devised by Western powers and a treacherous internal ‘fifth
column’ to overthrow ‘la Révolution’ (McGovern 2013; Touré 1969: 24–51). Thousands of
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Guineans were tortured, executed, or perished in prison camps during this era, accused of
treason in what were, effectively, state-sponsored conspiracy theories that bolstered state
power (cf. Silverstein 2002). While Guineans of all ethnolinguistic groups suffered under
Sékou Touré, Fulɓe were at times singled out for suspicion. In 1976, Touré announced that a
group of Fulɓe elites was conspiring to overthrow the government; this was followed by a
surge of anti-Fulɓe government rhetoric – and, according to some, targeted persecution
(Touré 1977; Bah 1990). But, paradoxically, while Touré’s rhetoric and policies sometimes
targeted particular ethnic groups, his socialist government also instilled a powerful sense of
national unity among Guineans, including Fulɓe (McGovern 2017). To this day, movements
to uncover the ‘truth’ – to either vindicate the actions of the state under Touré or demonstrate
its abuses – have continued unresolved (Arieff and McGovern 2013).
It was against this backdrop, where an objective historical truth was perceived to exist and yet
remained hidden, that many Guineans suspected conspiratorial activities on the part of
powerful individuals and institutions during the 2010 elections. Conspiracy theory deals with
what is hidden, with the view that power operates in the world secretly and must be
approached with suspicion (West and Sanders 2003). Conspiracy theorizing thus resonates
with wider beliefs in the invisible workings of power, agency and intention that prevail in
many contexts of uncertainty and insecurity in Africa, apparent especially in studies of
sorcery and witchcraft (Geschiere 1997; De Boeck and Plissart 2004; Ashforth 2005; West
2005). Mariane Ferme argues that, in Sierra Leone, people look beneath the surfaces of
everyday life for deeper, often sinister, meanings through a ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’, a
practice of interpretation shaped by a violent history of slavery and warfare (Ferme 2001: 7).
Within modes of thought that acknowledge the operation of invisible, often occult, forms of
power and agency, conspiracy theories surrounding political events may become integral
parts of developing crises, as Stephen Ellis (1999) has suggested was the case during the
Liberian civil war.4
To question power and to constantly scrutinize one’s surroundings through a hermeneutic of
suspicion may seem paranoid (or ‘paranoid within reason’), but it is also an intellectual way
4
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assassination, alien abduction and right-wing nationalist movements (Dean 1998; Barkun
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of engaging with the world. Studies of conspiracy theorizing have emphasized the agency
with which people seek out multiple sources of information and attempt to interpret, analyse
and understand them (Briggs 2004; Boyer 2006; Waters 1997). Theories of conspiracy can
productively disrupt dominant narratives that are otherwise taken for granted (Boyer 2006).
Like gossip, to which it bears a family resemblance, conspiracy theorizing can unite groups,
providing a means of bonding for people living through difficult, complex events (Silverstein
2002; Gluckman 1963). By connecting local events with global powers, conspiracy
theorizing gives meaning to misfortunes that might otherwise appear meaningless (Turner
2004). There may even be pleasure in the practice of conspiracy theorizing, of pursuing the
possibility of truth in a situation that might otherwise seem overwhelmingly beyond
individual control (Stewart 1999: 14). Conspiracy theory offers a tantalizing promise of
connecting the dots, of fitting puzzle pieces together to reveal a clear picture. Producing
compelling narratives, often with clearly defined relationships of cause and effect, conspiracy
theory allows people to reconcile cynicism and disbelief and commit – perhaps temporarily –
to actions and positions that they might otherwise find untenable (cf. Navaro-Yashin 2002;
Wedeen 1999; Pomerantsev 2014; Yurchak 2005).
This article approaches conspiracy theorizing not as irrelevant or opposed to official political
processes, but rather as meaningful political practice that may have significant effects. I
suggest that conspiracy theory is an emergent form of politics. Through conspiracy
theorizing, previously flexible identities and opinions crystallize in particular actions,
orientations and events. In this process of emergence, people may begin to perceive
grievances more acutely, become willing to take new risks, and even go so far as to commit
acts of violence they would not previously have contemplated. In describing the ‘state of
emergency’ inhabited by many residents of African cities who face daily uncertainty,
ambiguity and crisis, AbdouMaliq Simone characterizes ‘emergency’ as both a ‘rupture in the
organization of the present’ and a ‘process of things in the making, of the emergence of new
thinking and practices still unstable’ (Simone 2004: 4). With this emergence comes ‘the end
of a certain flexibility of interpretation’ (ibid.: 5). During Guinea’s 2010 elections, conspiracy
theorizing led people to moments when flexible interpretations of political and ethnic
repertoires hardened into particular configurations; newly fixed orientations guided decisive
actions, reshaped and strengthened notions of community, reinforced convictions of injustice
and betrayal, and, for some, warranted violence. I do not suggest that conspiracy theorizing
caused ethnic targeting and violence, but rather that it shaped the emergence of political
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sensibilities, which in turn influenced people’s actions – much as Osborn (2008) has shown
with regard to rumours and political violence in Kenya. Examined ethnographically,
conspiracy theory narratives reveal relations in the process of emergence – affinities and
antipathies that draw on ideas already in circulation, while also reconfiguring assumptions
about what is taken for granted and what is possible (cf. Ellison 2006).
My analysis draws on eighteen months of ethnographic research in Guinea’s Fouta Djallon
highlands and in Dakar, Senegal, where many people from the Fouta Djallon live. A former
Sufi Muslim theocracy ruled by Fulɓe nobles and clerics until the French conquest of 1896,
the Fouta Djallon today is home to a population that predominantly identifies as ethnic Fulɓe.
However, status differences remain salient between people descended from the theocratic
elite, those whose ancestors were taken ‘captive’ and compelled into serfdom by Fulɓe
warriors, and members of artisan castes such as potters and leatherworkers (Furth 2005;
Derman 1973). Ethnic identity here is relative to one’s surroundings, and the latter groups are
considered Fulɓe in some contexts but not in others (Amselle 1998). Many Fulɓe left Guinea
during Sékou Touré’s presidency, especially in the 1970s after Touré announced the
discovery of a Fulɓe counter-revolutionary plot. After Touré’s death in 1984, Fulɓe came to
dominate Guinea’s post-socialist commercial sector and gained a collective reputation for
wealth relative to other Guineans. In 2010, I witnessed dramatic changes in how the people
around me discussed national politics, prominent political figures and differences between
ethnic groups. Theories of conspiracy became part of everyday talk, and new political
orientations emerged.
Guinean politics in 2010: an overview
That multiparty presidential elections were occurring at all in Guinea in 2010 was remarkable
to many Guineans and international observers alike, given the turbulent series of events that
had unfolded prior to that moment. Guinea’s president since 1984, Lansana Conté, died in
December 2008 after a long period of illness. A military junta immediately took power, and
Moussa ‘Dadis’ Camara, a previously unknown army captain, declared himself president.
Dadis initially made himself popular by promising to root out government corruption and
then step down to allow a peaceful transition to civilian rule. From February to April 2009,
Dadis personally conducted televised interrogations of Conté administration officials whom
he accused of corruption or drug trafficking. Popularly known as ‘The Dadis Show’, these
interrogations made a satisfying spectacle for a population that had suffered increasing
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poverty and political repression for decades, all while the country’s mineral wealth and
natural resources were pillaged by foreign powers and members of its own government.
But as the months passed, Dadis appeared to be tightening his hold on power and the prospect
of democratic presidential elections seemed increasingly unlikely. ‘No one is born a soldier,’
he proclaimed on at least one occasion, suggesting that he could remove his uniform and
present himself as a civilian presidential candidate.5 Few believed that other candidates
would get a fair chance at victory if Dadis ran against them. Civilian political opposition
parties called for Dadis to allow the organization of fair, internationally observed elections
and step down.
Then came an event that shocked and horrified the country. On 28 September 2009, the fiftyfirst anniversary of the day on which Guineans voted for independence from France, the
leaders of several different political parties united to lead a protest rally at Conakry’s 28
September Stadium, named in commemoration of the independence vote. Once the
demonstration was under way, military forces arrived, barricaded the stadium entrance and
began shooting into the crowds, killing and raping hundreds of civilians.6 By December, a
United Nations Commission of Inquiry found evidence of responsibility for the massacre
among several junta officers, including Dadis and his aide-de-camp, Aboubacar ‘Toumba’
Diakité. On 3 December, believing that the president had betrayed him to the Commission of
Inquiry, Toumba shot Dadis in the head and disappeared into hiding.7 Dadis was medically
5

See ‘Guinée/élection: le chef de la junte menace d’“ôter la tenue” pour être candidat’, 16

April 2009, Jeune Afrique,
<http://www.jeuneafrique.com/depeches/117789/politique/guineeelection-le-chef-de-la-juntemenace-doter-la-tenue-pour-etre-candidat/>, accessed 9 October 2017. Lansana Conté
himself had assumed the presidency through a military takeover after Sékou Touré’s death,
giving Dadis a historical precedent for remaining in power while also giving many Guineans
a historical justification not to support Dadis’s continued rule.
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At least 156 civilians were killed or disappeared in the stadium massacre, and at least 109

women were publicly raped; the actual numbers of casualties are likely much higher (UN
International Commission of Inquiry on Guinea 2009).
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extradited to Guinea in March 2017 (‘Guinée: le militaire “Toumba” Diakité, désormais
incarcéré à Conakry’, RFI, 13 March 2017 <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20170313-guinee-
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evacuated to Morocco and for several weeks no one knew whether he was alive or dead.8
With Dadis indisposed, the junta’s second in command, General Sékouba Konaté, assumed
the role of ‘interim president’ and agreed to appoint a civilian cabinet and oversee
internationally observed elections. Against this dramatic backdrop, election preparations
began in the early months of 2010. Twenty-four candidates began campaigning for the first
round of elections on 27 June.
At the time of the 28 September massacre, I was living in the Fouta Djallon in a town I call
Daande Caanguel, a day’s drive away from Conakry. Despite the geographic distance, an air
of anxiety pervaded the town for days afterwards, as people called and texted friends and
family in Conakry for news. The immediate outrage at the violence was fuelled by graphic
accounts of the massacre gleaned from phone conversations with survivors and circulated
through town. With the junta refusing to release the bodies of those who were killed, rumours
of secret mass graves flew thick and fast. The small measure of support Dadis had still
enjoyed in Daande Caanguel plummeted. My interlocutors expressed their anger, shock and
grief at the events, speaking of the rapes and concealed bodies with particular horror.
However, as the days passed, a few people began to refer to the stadium massacre as an

militaire-toumba-diakite-desormais-incarcere-prison-conakry-senegal-extrade>, accessed 9
October 2018). He is in prison awaiting trial at the time of writing. In a bizarre twist to the
story, the incarcerated Toumba reportedly escaped an assassination attempt by poisoning in
December 2017 (‘Maître Paul Yomba: “Voici comment Toumba Diakité a échappé bel à un
empoisonnement”’, Aminata.com, 21 December 2017 <https://aminata.com/maitre-paulyomba-voici-toumba-diakite-a-echappe-bel-a-empoisonnement/>, accessed 9 October 2018).
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Dadis was transported to Burkina Faso in January 2010 and remains in exile there at the

time of writing. In November 2017, a panel of Guinean judges concluded a nearly eight-yearlong investigation into the massacre and brought charges against ‘more than 14 suspects’,
including Dadis, Toumba and other former and current high-level officials (‘Guinea: judges
conclude 2009 massacre inquiry’, Human Rights Watch, 10 November 2017
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/10/guinea-judges-conclude-2009-massacre-inquiry>,
accessed 9 October 2018). However, no progress has been made in bringing those charged to
trial. The stadium massacre has been subject to a long-running ‘preliminary examination’ by
the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (see <https://www.icc-cpi.int/guinea>,
accessed 9 October 2018).
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attack explicitly targeted against Fulɓe. Although Guineans from many ethnolinguistic
groups had attended the demonstration and numbered among the victims, some interlocutors
insisted that Fulɓe had been killed, and Fulɓe women raped, in disproportionately large
numbers. Furthermore, in the days after the massacre, soldiers ransacked and committed
further violence in several Fulɓe-majority Conakry neighbourhoods.9 Linking these events
with the history of anti-Fulɓe persecution during the Sékou Touré era, some people
concluded that Fulɓe had again become the targets of the state. Others I knew treated these
allegations with caution, reasoning that since Fulɓe were the largest and most entrepreneurial
ethnic group, owning most of the shops, merchandise and houses in the affected areas, they
would naturally suffer the most damage. In October, amid continuing insecurity, the US State
Department evacuated non-essential embassy personnel and suspended the Fulbright
programme, which was then my main source of research funding; I was evacuated to Mali
and eventually moved to Senegal, where I resumed my research among Guineans in Dakar.
I returned to Guinea in May 2010 to find the fear and anger I had witnessed in the wake of
the massacre replaced by excitement over the electoral campaign. The majority of people I
knew in Daande Caanguel and my new research site, a smaller town I call Hamdallaye,
supported Cellou Dalein Diallo, one of several ethnic Fulɓe candidates hailing from the Fouta
Djallon. A former government minister under Lansana Conté, Cellou Dalein had previously
been criticized, even by Fulɓe, for complicity in the corruption of the Conté administration.
Now, however, my interlocutors spoke hopefully of his supposedly imminent victory:

9

The Human Rights Watch investigation into the 28 September massacre found some

evidence of ethnic targeting against Fulɓe: ‘During the sexual assaults against girls and
women of Peuhl [Fulɓe] ethnicity, assailants frequently made ethnically biased comments,
insulting and appearing to threaten the Peuhl in particular’ (Human Rights Watch 2009: 8).
With regard to the activity of the security forces in residential neighbourhoods after the
massacre, Human Rights Watch reports that, ‘in the course of the attacks, the soldiers and
irregular militia killed, raped, vandalized, and stole from residents. They also repeatedly
insulted and made threats against people of Peuhl ethnicity in particular’ (ibid.: 9). Fulɓe are
referred to as ‘Peuhl’ or ‘Peul’ in French and sometimes in English.
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Guinea’s three presidents since independence had belonged to other ethnic groups, but with
Cellou Dalein the country would finally have a Fulɓe leader.10
The elections on 27 June passed peacefully, though with significant logistical problems in
some areas. The results were announced on 2 July: Cellou Dalein came in first with 39.72 per
cent of the vote. With 50 per cent needed for an outright win, a run-off election was set
between him and the second-place finisher, Alpha Condé, who had won 20.63 per cent.11 The
run-off election was originally supposed to have been held within two weeks of the first
round, but it was repeatedly delayed and rescheduled for September, October, and finally
November – first while the Guinean Supreme Court verified the results, and then in response
to accusations of sabotage and cheating from multiple parties, questions about bias within the
Independent National Electoral Commission, and violent clashes between the two leading
candidates’ constituents. The repeated delays suspended much of everyday life in a prolonged
state of waiting. Schools, which closed early for the summer to accommodate the June
elections, remained closed until after the run-off, even when it was delayed past the normal
start date for the new academic year. People postponed travel, business and other plans until
after the elections. Some individuals I hoped to interview for my research demurred,
promising to speak with me after the elections.
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from various ethnicities and expressed grave doubts about Cellou Dalein until shortly before
the June 2010 elections, when support from Guinean Fulɓe in both Senegal and the Fouta
Djallon coalesced around Cellou Dalein’s candidacy. Voters overwhelmingly justified their
shift in position with the arguments that it was the Fulɓe ‘turn’ to control the presidency, that
Fulɓe deserved the presidency after having suffered persecution under Sékou Touré, and that
all Fulɓe were now ‘united’ for the first time in history.
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International observers identified a number of problems with the 27 June elections, but

determined that these resulted from capacity shortfalls rather than from systemic fraud.
Nevertheless, fourteen of the twenty-four candidates submitted complaints of fraud to the
Guinean Supreme Court, which reviewed the complaints and ultimately invalidated about
900,000 votes, or 21.4 per cent of all ballots cast. After these votes were removed from the
final results, Cellou Dalein’s share of the vote increased to 43.69 per cent and Alpha Condé’s
decreased to 18.25 per cent (Carter Center 2011: 11).
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During this time of extended anticipation, people sought information in a variety of ways.
Some crowded onto benches in town video clubs every evening to watch the news on
Guinea’s state television station, although viewers often condemned it as ‘propaganda’ even
as they watched. Others listened for occasional mentions of Guinea on the daily Africa news
programmes aired by BBC and RFI radio, which they deemed more reliable than state
television. Phone calls to friends and relatives in Conakry yielded first-hand stories about
what was happening in the capital. Some people asked me for news, assuming that I, as an
American, must have access to better information channels than they did. (I, meanwhile,
crowded into the same video clubs and listened to the same radio programmes as everyone
else.) Rumours circulated quickly, their sources impossible to verify. People shared widely
what news they heard and speculated about possible explanations for events that seemed
suspicious or confusing. Was the election being fixed? Were the repeated delays good or
bad? This was an environment where determining what was true could be extremely difficult,
but as people interpreted news stories and made connections between different events,
suspicion not infrequently seemed warranted.
For example, the head of the Independent National Electoral Commission, Ben Sékou Sylla,
was convicted of fraud, convincing many in the Fouta Djallon that Cellou Dalein would have
won an outright 50 per cent of the vote but for Sylla’s alleged perfidy. On 13 September,
Sylla died in France, where he had reportedly sought medical treatment for an illness. The
run-off was scheduled for 19 September, less than a week away. Immediately, people around
me began to speculate that Sylla had been secretly assassinated by followers of Alpha Condé,
who wanted to keep past fraud hidden and create further delays in order to organize more
fraud. The fact that Sylla’s death occurred in France, Guinea’s former colonial power and
Alpha Condé’s country of residence for many years, led some people to suggest that it would
not be properly investigated. Then, on 15 September, an apparently accidental fire destroyed
a warehouse full of election materials in a military barracks in Conakry. Interim president
General Konaté announced that the run-off would be postponed. In protest, Cellou Dalein’s
party called for a ville morte (general strike), to be held on 20 September. The evening of 19
September, I watched in Hamdallaye’s video club as the anchorman of the state news
programme read a decree issued by the military officer then acting as governor of Conakry:
the ville morte was absolutely forbidden. Government functionaries who failed to report to
work would be considered to have resigned their posts and any businesses that kept their
doors closed would be seized by the state. My fellow video club audience members
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exclaimed that this last measure was explicitly targeted at Fulɓe, who owned most businesses
in Conakry. For some people in the Fouta Djallon, Sylla’s death, the warehouse fire, the
postponement of the election and the interdiction of the ville morte all added up to convincing
evidence that the election was being rigged against Cellou Dalein and therefore against Fulɓe,
who were once again under threat just as they had been during Sékou Touré’s presidency.
These were circumstances under which conspiracy theorizing was not an irrational reaction
but something akin to Marcus’s ‘paranoia within reason’, where the workings of power were
opaque and where fear and suspicion had been justified in the past. Charles Briggs points out
that the concept of paranoia itself is subjective and shaped by political-economic conditions:
‘What may seem paranoid to middle-class whites is unfortunately often realistic for racialized
and oppressed populations whose everyday lives are patterned by structural violence and
strategies for dealing with it’ (Briggs 2004: 182). In the previous two years alone, Guineans
had experienced the end of a predatory authoritarian regime, a coup d’état, military rule and
extreme military violence against civilians. In prior decades, they had experienced a
repressive socialist state and, before that, colonial subjugation. In 2010, multiple parties –
including the military, civilian politicians and former colonial powers – might have been
vying for political control just as they had at various times throughout Guinea’s history. That
some Guineans engaged with national politics by theorizing conspiracies shows not the
existence of a wilfully ignorant or gullible electorate, but rather a population that paid
attention to the workings of powerful actors and institutions, even when these were difficult
to discern, and sought to analyse their meaning and understand their implications.
This discussion of Guinea’s political landscape in 2010 sets the stage for the following two
episodes, each of which presents a case of conspiracy theory that arose in the months leading
up to the run-off election. Each case shows how previously flexible notions of Fulɓe ethnicity
crystallized with the emerging conviction that a vast Maninka plot was under way to sabotage
Cellou Dalein’s chances of winning the presidency.
Episode 1: Alpha Condé’s henchmen in Canada (or, who plotted the massacre?)
In September 2010, just after Ben Sékou Sylla’s death in France, I began to hear people talk
about a video of Dadis, the erstwhile junta leader who had been shot in the head, circulating
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around the Fouta Djallon on video CDs.12 ‘It shows the truth about the stadium massacre –
that Alpha Condé was behind it,’ said Amadou, the young man who first told me about the
video.13 I was surprised. Most people I knew, including Amadou, had previously attributed
responsibility for the massacre to Dadis himself. At the time of the massacre, my
interlocutors rarely mentioned Alpha Condé’s name. When they did, they acknowledged him
as an old opposition figure known for criticizing Guinea’s former presidents – both of whom
had accused him of treason – and for living much of his life exiled in France. But Amadou
insisted that, in the video, Dadis revealed, first, that Alpha Condé had approached him with
the request to kill Cellou Dalein, a request that Dadis had refused; and second, that Alpha
Condé had been the true force behind the stadium massacre. ‘If it isn’t true, then why aren’t
Alpha Condé’s people denying it publicly?’ demanded Amadou, seeing my scepticism.
Over the next couple of days, I heard many different people recount the content of the video
and discuss its implications. Alpha Condé had asked Dadis to ‘eliminate’ Cellou Dalein.
Alpha Condé had plotted the massacre to rid himself of future presidential rivals. At the very
least, Alpha Condé had encouraged the other opposition leaders to hold the stadium
demonstration even after the junta forbade it, though he himself withdrew and travelled
abroad to safety.
Eventually, I saw the video myself. It was apparently recorded after the stadium massacre but
before Dadis was shot two months later. In the nine-minute segment, Dadis regales two
unidentified men, one of whom holds a microphone, with a long, petulant diatribe of the sort
for which he became known during his brief presidency.14 He rails against Alpha Condé as
cunning (rusé) and malicious (méchant). He points out that all the other major opposition
party leaders had attended the stadium demonstration on 28 September, but that Alpha Condé
12
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media format in Guinea in 2010, given that the internet was not then available except in the
largest cities, and even then was often too slow to accommodate video streaming. A version
of the Dadis video I discuss here can be viewed online at
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wfUcY1eAmDQ> (accessed 9 October 2018).
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had been suspiciously absent. Absolving himself entirely of any wrongdoing, Dadis claims
that Alpha Condé planned the massacre so that the other opposition leaders would be blamed
for the consequences of their illegal demonstration and thus disqualified from the elections,
leaving the field open for himself. Dadis argues that Alpha Condé was accustomed (habitué)
to treachery, citing two well-known allegations from Condé’s past. First, during Sékou
Touré’s presidency, Condé was sentenced to death in absentia for complicity in the
‘Portuguese aggression’ of 1970, an ultimately unsuccessful attack on Conakry by colonial
troops from neighbouring Guinea-Bissau, mercenaries and Guinean exiles.15 Second, in 2000,
Condé was convicted of sedition against then-president Lansana Conté’s government and
sentenced to two years in prison.16
People in the Fouta Djallon swiftly incorporated this video into their understandings of the
massacre and its significance for the elections. Everyone I spoke with seemed to find Dadis’s
accusations against Alpha Condé entirely credible, despite Dadis’s history of erratic
behaviour and his evident interest in deflecting responsibility for the massacre. When
Boubacar, a low-level government functionary in Daande Caanguel, cited the video as
evidence of Condé’s long-standing penchant for treachery, I challenged him. ‘But is there any
proof that Alpha Condé was involved in the Portuguese aggression?’ I asked. ‘The video is
proof!’ Boubacar exclaimed. ‘Dadis knew it! When you become president, you gain access to
a lot of secret information.’ ‘Even presidents who are nothing but young, drunk soldiers know
secret information?’ I asked, using language that many of my interlocutors, including
Boubacar, had often used to describe Dadis only a short time before. ‘Yes!’ Boubacar
responded without hesitation.
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Condé, who had run against President Conté in Guinea’s 1998 presidential election, was

arrested after the election and charged with attempting to leave the country illegally to recruit
mercenaries from Côte d’Ivoire in order to overthrow the Guinean government. He was
convicted in 2000, just days after President Conté announced that a recent series of crossborder attacks into Guinea by rebels from Liberia and Sierra Leone had been orchestrated by
Alpha Condé in collaboration with former Liberian president and warlord Charles Taylor
(McGovern 2017: 139–45).
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This kind of faith in Dadis was new, but Boubacar was only one of many people I heard
express it. In addition to finding Dadis’s accusations believable, people in both Daande
Caanguel and Hamdallaye began to draw on the video to construct new theories to explain
the massacre as something they considered even more threatening than military aggression
against unarmed civilians: not only had Alpha Condé planned the massacre, he had done so
as part of a larger Maninka conspiracy against the Fulɓe. The most popular version of this
line of thinking posited that Alpha Condé had plotted the massacre in league with Sékouba
Konaté, Dadis’s second in command in the junta, who assumed the presidency after Dadis
was shot. According to this theory, Alpha Condé and Sékouba Konaté, both ethnic Maninka,
had arranged the massacre in order to eliminate Cellou Dalein and the other non-Maninka
opposition leaders so that the Maninka could collectively take power in Guinea. Dadis, who
had previously been reviled throughout the Fouta Djallon as the dangerously unhinged
mastermind of a violent atrocity, now appeared exonerated, the hapless dupe of a vast
conspiracy. The sudden death of Dadis’s twenty-five-year-old son in Canada around the time
that the video appeared led some people to further theorize that he had been murdered by
Alpha Condé’s Canada-based henchmen in retaliation for Dadis’s newly publicized
remarks.17 According to this theory, Alpha Condé had at his command a powerful network
that could carry out assassinations on other continents – Ben Sékou Sylla in France and
Dadis’s son in Canada. From then on, people cited the video as evidence that, as ethnic Fulɓe,
they were experiencing the latest iteration of a grave and long-standing collective threat that
dated back to the anti-Fulɓe persecution of Sékou Touré’s presidency. Now more than ever,
they needed to stand together – and that meant supporting Cellou Dalein Diallo, no matter
how much they had previously criticized him for the eleven years he had served in Lansana
Conté’s corrupt administration.
And so, with the conspiracy theories that surrounded the Dadis video emerged a particular set
of anxieties related to ethnic targeting. At the time of the stadium massacre, people in Daande
Caanguel had frequently criticized the junta in power with statements such as: ‘We need a
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civilian government.’ With the circulation of the video of Dadis and the associated
discussions of a Maninka conspiracy spearheaded by Alpha Condé, people in the Fouta
Djallon began to remark that anything, even a continuing military government, would be
preferable to a Condé presidency.
Episode II: The poisoned water (or was it yoghurt?)
On 22 October, about a hundred attendees at a Conakry meeting of Alpha Condé’s party, the
RPG (Rassemblement du Peuple Guinéen/Rally of the Guinean People), experienced nausea
and vomiting and were taken to hospital. RPG supporters immediately launched accusations
of poisoning against Cellou Dalein’s party, the UFDG (Union des Forces Démocratiques de
Guinée/Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea). Fulɓe vendors – presumably all UFDG
supporters – had, according to RPG supporters, sold the meeting attendees poisoned water
(or, some said, yoghurt). In retaliation, RPG supporters began to attack Fulɓe-owned houses
and shops in several cities in the eastern savannah region of Upper Guinea, predominantly
inhabited by ethnic Maninka. Over the next few days, thousands of Fulɓe living in Upper
Guinea left their homes and businesses and fled to the Fouta Djallon.18
Outraged by this violence against people they spoke about as their extended family, my
interlocutors discussed the allegations of water poisoning over and over again. Some people
18
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people died, and the number of displaced Fulɓe could have been anywhere between 1,800
and 20,000 people (Carter Center 2011: 14). According to an estimate by the International
Committee of the Red Cross in Conakry, 2,800 people were displaced on 29 and 30 October
alone, and UFDG party representatives claimed that between 15,000 and 20,000 people in
total were displaced from Upper Guinea cities (Penney 2010). International Crisis Group
found that the authorities’ failure to respond effectively to the rumours and the security
forces’ failure to protect victims from the violence increased Fulɓe suspicions of the electoral
process (ICG 2011: 7). It is unclear to what extent RPG party leaders may have encouraged
the violence against Fulɓe, but they at least treated the rumours of poisoning as a legitimate
concern and called for an investigation (‘La méfiance reste de mise entre Cellou Dalein
Diallo et Alpha Condé’, France 24, 29 October 2010
<http://www.france24.com/fr/20101029-guinee-presidentielle-2e-tour-partisans-alpha-condeempoisonnement-mefiance-cellou-dalein-diallo>, accessed 9 October 2018).
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simply sought to contradict the theory of poisoning espoused by Alpha Condé’s constituents.
Elder people tended to advance a particular natural explanation, which was that the RPG
meeting’s attendees had drunk water without having eaten anything, and everyone knew that
drinking water on an empty stomach could cause sickness. I first heard this point of view
from the elderly grandmother of the family with whom I lived in Hamdallaye. Shortly
afterwards, as I walked down the street to the marketplace, I passed two elderly men just as
one was explaining to the other, ‘You know, if someone drinks water but they haven’t eaten
…,’ while the other man nodded sagely and made sounds of agreement. I soon heard their
words echoed in conversations all over town. The elders appeared to be drawing on an
interpretive framework of traditional knowledge about health and illness. I suspect that by
classifying the illness as natural and the RPG supporters’ suspicions as unfounded, they were
also trying to prevent the violence from escalating further. When a son in my Hamdallaye
family mentioned that some young men in the nearby city of Labé were talking about rising
up against the Maninka minorities there in retaliation for the violence against Fulɓe in Upper
Guinea, the grandmother said sharply, ‘Hey, they should stop! If it goes on like this, we’ll
have an ethnic war.’ All that week, elder men at the mosques urged everyone to trust in God,
stay calm, and not respond to provocations; violence had occurred in every other region of
Guinea, but the Fouta Djallon had remained peaceful and this must continue. Many people,
young and old, repeated these words and seemed to take comfort in them, and I heard of no
further calls for retaliatory violence against Maninka living in the Fouta Djallon at that time.
But after another week or two, many younger people began to counter the story of alleged
poisoning with a different, more complex theory of conspiracy. What had actually happened,
several people informed me, was that Alpha Condé’s operatives had poisoned their own
supporters in order to rally the population to attack the Fulɓe. As evidence for this theory,
they pointed to the fact that no one at the meeting had died. ‘If someone genuinely wanted to
eliminate them, they would have chosen a substance that would kill,’ one man in Hamdallaye
proclaimed definitively. Some of my interlocutors chuckled over a rumour that the RPG
leaders had eventually decided that they needed some of the hospitalized party members to
die so that they could prove to international observers that they were the victims of a UFDG
plot; when the alleged poison victims heard this news, they immediately stopped pretending
to be sick and walked out of the hospital. Like the elders, the younger people were using an
interpretive framework to try to understand the violent attacks against Fulɓe. But whereas the
elders claimed that the violence was all based on a misunderstanding, the youth located the
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problem with high-level RPG party leaders manipulating their followers and inciting them to
violence. No one gave much credence to my own suggestion that perhaps the water had been
contaminated with a parasite, as water in Guinea sometimes was; nausea and diarrhoea did
not strike me as exceptional, but rather as an unfortunate part of everyday life. ‘No, this was
definitely a poison substance,’ I was told. One young man claimed that a sample of the water
served at the meeting would be taken to a Western country with laboratories that could test
for poison, and then the truth would be revealed. While I was satisfied with a surface
explanation, younger people were deploying a hermeneutic of suspicion, carefully examining
every possible part of the story for signs of nefarious activity that they were certain had
occurred.19
A proposed joint tour of reconciliation – in which Alpha Condé and Cellou Dalein would
travel the country together and show their supporters that there was no need for violence –
never materialized. Alpha Condé’s constituents did not want him to apologize to Cellou
Dalein for the violence against the Fulɓe, since Cellou Dalein had not apologized for the
poisoning of the water, nor had Cellou Dalein’s wife visited the poison victims in the
hospital. Some of Alpha Condé’s supporters even claimed to fear for their candidate’s life if
he ventured into Fulɓe-dominated areas.20 Whether or not Alpha Condé himself believed in
the theory of poisoning, he did not fail to recognize the alleged victims. An RPG supporter I
knew in Conakry later gave me a video CD containing footage of Alpha Condé visiting his ill
constituents at the hospital, shaking his head in sorrow at their suffering and thanking them
for their support. Hostility intensified between supporters of the RPG and the UFDG.
As reports of Fulɓe displaced from their homes and businesses by the violence in Upper
Guinea began to reach Hamdallaye and Daande Caanguel, people I knew became
increasingly convinced of the existence of a Maninka conspiracy against the Fulɓe. Those
19
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who had been displaced were registered to vote in Upper Guinea. Now, back in the Fouta
Djallon, they were disenfranchised. Fulɓe had dominated much of the commercial sector in
Upper Guinea, as they did throughout the country. Now, their businesses had been looted by
Maninka who, according to my interlocutors, resented their commercial success. The people
around me worried about the effect that thousands of lost votes for Cellou Dalein would have
on the outcome of the election.21 They also noted with grim pleasure that Fulɓe merchants in
Conakry were boycotting all business with Upper Guinea cities; the looted goods were now
the only merchandise available and prices were skyrocketing. Meanwhile, the plans for the
run-off election moved forward, despite further delays in the wake of the violence. Through
theories and counter-theories of conspiracy, more and more people in the Fouta Djallon came
to see themselves as the victims of a Maninka plot to prevent a Fulɓe candidate from winning
the presidency. This emerging sensibility shaped the actions people took on the night when
the final election results were announced.
Violence, crystallization, and the aftermath of conspiracy theory
Despite the tempestuous months leading up to the run-off, when it was finally held on 7
November, the voting process passed smoothly in both Daande Caanguel and Hamdallaye.
The residents of both towns spoke positively, anticipating that Cellou Dalein’s presidency
was imminent. But their tones changed in the following days, when partial preliminary results
began to be released on the nightly news. No one expected Cellou Dalein to win many votes
in Maninka-dominated regions, but it gradually became clear that he had not won as many
votes as expected in coastal Lower Guinea, a region inhabited by ethnic Susu and other
groups whose support the UFDG had been counting on.22
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Hamdallaye and Daande Caanguel were allowed to vote in the end, although no one seemed
sure whether they would be able to do so until election day arrived. The Carter Center
confirms that some Fouta Djallon districts allowed displaced persons to vote, but notes that
there was no consistent policy on the issue, and some Fouta Djallon polling stations had their
results disqualified for exceeding the ten-vote limit for ballots cast by voters registered
elsewhere (Carter Center 2011: 42, 114).
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The days passed with increasing tension until 15 November, when the electoral commission
had promised to release the complete results. Early that day, neighbours and friends in
Daande Caanguel told me that youth in Conakry and Labé were marching in the streets to
protest against what they called electoral ‘fraud’. According to some, the protests were
becoming violent. I made several phone calls to friends in Conakry and Labé, who confirmed
that young people had been protesting all morning, setting up blockades in the streets that the
police and military had broken up. ‘Things are bad,’ one young man summarized bleakly.
Monsieur Bah, a regular interlocutor who worked near my house, stopped by to greet me and
referred cryptically to a possible ‘imminent crisis’. ‘You should not move around much
today,’ he advised. ‘If you get scared, call me and I will come and take you to stay at my
family’s house.’ I thanked him and asked what exactly he thought might happen. ‘No, no,
nothing will happen,’ he hastened to reassure me. ‘But just in case you get scared.’
I took a midday stroll around Daande Caanguel and stopped to visit Souleymane, a
shopkeeper who sold buckets, brooms and other domestic goods. The normally cheerful
Souleymane was in a dreary mood, sighing that business was slow and problems were
everywhere. He segued into a lament that ‘they’ were trying to steal the elections, mentioning
the recent clashes in Conakry and Labé as evidence that people were so upset about the
‘fraud’ that they were even willing to fight. ‘Eh! They should stop [yo ɓe accu],’ I said, using
the exact Pular phrase that the grandmother of my Hamdallaye family had used when she
heard that the youth in Labé wanted violent revenge against the Maninka. Souleymane and
his neighbour in the next shop, a hardware dealer, both chuckled. The hardware vendor called
over, ‘Hey, Susanna, you’re not a Maninka, are you?’ and held up two machetes from his
shop as he spoke. I called back, ‘Even if I am a Maninka, so what?’ He smiled and
brandished the two machetes, saying, ‘This is what!’
I gasped in horror. I had never heard such a straightforward threat of physical violence, even
an apparently playful one, levelled directly against any group of people in Guinea, especially
by Fulɓe, who thus far had prided themselves in exacting only economic revenge on the
Maninka who had attacked Fulɓe in other regions. Now, something about the social order had
changed; statements that would never have been uttered in casual conversation only a short
of the first-round votes, had allied with the UFDG for the second round. Much of Lower
Guinea had voted for Sidya Touré in the first round and many assumed that Touré would be
able to deliver this support to Cellou Dalein.
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time before had become acceptable. This change was confirmed a few minutes later when I
saw Madiou, a university student who enjoyed practising his English with me. Madiou had
just been to a meeting where, he said, local UFDG representatives had told the youth that if
the electoral commission announced that Cellou Dalein had not won, they were to go out and
kill all the Maninka in town.23 ‘There will be blood,’ Madiou said in English, with a calmness
that sent a chill down my spine. ‘The only way they can avoid problems now is to declare the
true results.’ ‘How will you know they are the true results?’ I asked. ‘Because they will be in
favour of Cellou! That is the truth,’ he responded firmly.
That evening, the complete election results were read on national television. As soon as
Alpha Condé was pronounced the winner, with 52.5 per cent of the vote, a man sitting near
me in Daande Caanguel’s video club called out, ‘It’s a lie!’ In a matter of seconds, everyone
got up from the benches and disappeared into the darkness outside. Making my way out of
the video club, I saw a large mass of people gathering on the town’s main street. I returned to
my house and listened for hours to the sounds of rocks landing on metal roofs, gunshots, and
a rising chorus of voices that sounded like a crowd cheering at a football match, punctuated
by individual cries of ‘Cellou Président!’
The next day, I walked through town and saw that four houses had been ransacked and
partially burned, their contents strewn across the streets. Two burnt-out shells of cars
remained parked nearby. No one had been hurt or killed; the Maninka residents of these
houses – all presumed to be Alpha Condé supporters – had left town before the election
results were announced. I soon heard reports of similar violence against Maninka and RPG
supporters in other Fouta Djallon towns. Government security forces responded violently to
Fulɓe protests in Fouta Djallon cities, reportedly causing up to a dozen deaths and hundreds
of injuries, and raping several women (Carter Center 2011: 15; ICG 2011: 7). President
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UFDG representatives had told everyone to stay calm and peaceful, regardless of the outcome
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Konaté declared a state of emergency and imposed a curfew to contain the unrest, and an
uneasy calm soon prevailed.24
Over the next few days, many people in Daande Caanguel expressed regret that the violence
against the Maninka households had occurred, although no one I knew admitted to having
participated in it.25 However, many were infuriated at what they referred to as a greater
‘injustice’: the security forces were responding with what seemed like disproportionate and
targeted violence against Fulɓe protesters when they had done nothing to stem the violence
and forced displacements of Fulɓe in Upper Guinea.26 Everyone appeared to accept as fact
that the Maninka had stolen the election and that Alpha Condé’s victory would never have
been possible without fraud. Many vowed that they would leave the country as soon as
possible, and then the Maninka would regret that they had made enemies of the Fulɓe, whose
commerce they all relied on.27
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Maninka, this violence seemed calculated more to express anger than to kill: protesters
destroyed property, but the only reported deaths were those caused by government security
forces. Similarly, Maninka violence against Fulɓe in October seemed focused on destruction
of property rather than human life (ICG 2011: 7).
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had intended.
26

Human Rights Watch reported that security forces ‘used excessive force and displayed a

lack of political neutrality when responding to election-related violence’ and committed
abuses against ethnic Fulɓe in particular (‘Guinea: witnesses describe security force
excesses’, Human Rights Watch, 29 November 2010
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/29/guinea-witnesses-describe-security-force-excesses>,
accessed 9 October 2018).
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who left after 2010. However, the sentiment stood out in stark relief against the statements of
the many Fulɓe I met in Dakar earlier that year who promised to ‘come home’ to the Fouta
Djallon after the elections.
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During the months leading up to the November elections, political sensibilities in the Fouta
Djallon shifted. Praise for Dadis and the military – and then anger against them – gradually
became overshadowed by the growing conviction that a vast Maninka plot was under way to
steal the election and prevent the Fulɓe from gaining power in Guinea. This conviction
emerged over time – building on perceptions of anti-Fulɓe targeting during the Sékou Touré
era and supported by conspiracy theorizing that purported to reveal the malevolent intentions
of Maninka leaders – and crystallized in moments of action including the attacks on Maninka
houses in Daande Caanguel.28 This emergence was a dialectical process between conspiracy
theories on the one hand and events and actions on the other. Explanatory narratives that
developed around the stadium massacre shifted over time, first with the apparent revelations
made by Dadis on video and then with the episode of alleged poisoning and the violence that
followed. These narratives helped create an environment in which suspicion hardened into
certainty, the formerly disliked Cellou Dalein became the unifying candidate for Fulɓe
everywhere, and violent attacks on neighbours’ property not only became possible but also,
to some, seemed justified.
Conclusion: emergent politics
The Americans and Europeans I knew in Guinea – some there as diplomats and others with
international or non-governmental organizations – sometimes mocked the conspiracy theories
that circulated in popular discourse. They criticized as paranoid the allegations of poisoned
water at the political meeting, the notion that Alpha Condé had orchestrated the stadium
massacre as part of a vast ethnic Maninka plot, or that Alpha Condé had followers in Canada
ready to commit murder on his behalf. One American friend in Conakry characterized the
October 2010 violence against Fulɓe in Upper Guinea as ‘not political, only ethnic’.
My analysis leads me to somewhat different conclusions. First, as I have discussed, the
theories of conspiracy I have described here were not necessarily irrational. Many Fulɓe
became convinced that they were the victims of targeted ethnic violence and that Cellou
Dalein had been cheated of victory by ethnicity-based electoral fraud. These conclusions, to
28
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structures themselves were not totally destroyed, but their contents generally were. Some
people in Daande Caanguel objected to the destruction for this reason, although one young
man told me that the damaged houses were the Fulɓe landlords’ ‘sacrifice’ to a greater cause.
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outsiders, may seem like paranoid exaggeration, but, in living memory, former president
Sékou Touré had accused Fulɓe of conspiracy against the state, and many Fulɓe lived in fear
during his presidency. Beyond suspicions of ethnic targeting, many people I knew in the
Fouta Djallon were convinced that France supported Alpha Condé’s candidacy and the US
backed Cellou Dalein’s – a notion that the Americans and Europeans I knew declared absurd.
But to Guineans, this suspicion might seem reasonably consistent with past Western
domination and exploitation in West Africa.29 Linking powerful international interests to
conspiracy in local affairs, people claimed broader significance for their fears – and not
without justification.
Second, the conspiracy theories that circulated in the Fouta Djallon in 2010 revealed the
emergence of particular political sensibilities at the same time as they shaped emergent
political realities. In a context where the new political institution of electoral democracy held
great promise yet remained surrounded by uncertainty, people interpreted what was visible
and theorized hidden truths. In the process, political orientations shifted. With the circulation
of the Dadis video, people in the Fouta Djallon constructed new theories about responsibility
for the stadium massacre and began to view continued military rule as a lesser threat
compared with the prospect of Alpha Condé’s presidency. With the accusations that Fulɓe
vendors had poisoned Alpha Condé’s supporters and the subsequent violence against Fulɓe in
Upper Guinea, Fouta Djallon residents theorized the existence of a Maninka plot to
fraudulently deprive Cellou Dalein of an otherwise assured electoral victory. As suspicions
mounted over time, people in the Fouta Djallon declared with increasing conviction that they,
as ethnic Fulɓe, were under attack.
Kathleen Stewart writes that one of the characteristics of conspiracy theory is that it
‘combines radical doubt with the sense that the truth is out there’ (1999: 17). Guineans who
29
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Condé were long-time friends (Camara et al. 2014), and former US ambassador to Guinea
Jackson McDonald lobbied for Cellou Dalein in Washington, DC. McDonald’s signature
appears on a retainer agreement made between JWI, a consulting firm where McDonald
worked after retiring from the Foreign Service, and Dalein’s UFDG party. The document is
filed with the US Department of Justice registry of US-based lobbyists for foreign clients and
can be viewed at <https://www.fara.gov/docs/4990-Exhibit-AB-20141216-25.pdf> (accessed
9 October 2018).

25

interrogated political events in 2010 through a hermeneutic of suspicion nevertheless
expressed certainty about the existence of an objective truth that could be uncovered.30 This
is evident, for example, in my interlocutors’ assertions that Dadis knew the truth of Alpha
Condé’s involvement in the Portuguese aggression, that a laboratory test in a Western country
would identify poison in the water, and that the true election results would favour Cellou
Dalein. Over time, conspiracy theorizing among Fouta Djallon residents served to establish a
truth that Cellou Dalein would win the presidential election. Anything that differed from that
‘truth’ was fraudulent, the product of a conspiracy against the Fulɓe.
In a complex and often troubling political situation, conspiracy theorizing yielded simple,
urgent narratives that people recognized as truth: Maninka were cheating, Fulɓe were under
attack. Some people drew on these narratives of conspiracy to call for Fulɓe unification
against other ethnic groups and even to justify acts of violence. Although the discord that
occurred in the wake of the election was not as extreme as some predicted – Fulɓe did not
leave the country en masse and ruin the economy, and Fulɓe violence against Maninka
involved destruction of property but not of human life – relations within and between groups
shifted. In theorizing conspiracies, people engaged with the election in emergent ways that
reshaped Guinea’s political landscape, possibly for years to come.
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